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Abstract
So far, security mechanisms for mobile devices have had difficulties
to protect from malicious threats due to the limited resources of mobile de-
vices. With the prevalence of cloud computing, one of promising solutions
to overcome the difficulties is to exploit cloud environments, where a remote
virtual machine performs the resource-consuming security analysis instead
of a mobile device. However, existing cloud-based solutions are still insuffi-
cient because of the code coverage problem and security level degradation.
Therefore, this thesis proposes a static and dynamic analysis based secu-
rity solution called SORCloud. For dynamic analysis, it offloads a process
of a suspicious application to a remote virtual machine for dynamic secu-
rity analysis, by which SORCloud resolves two problems mentioned above.
Through comprehensive experiments, we show how efficiently the proposed
scheme works and detects malicious behavior.
Keywords : Offloading, Cloud Systems, Static and Dynamic Analysis,
Malwares analysis tools
Student Number : 2013-23848
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The number of malwares targeting mobile devices such as smartphones
or tablets is growing fast. Mobile devices usually have several types of crit-
ical information: user’s position, certificates including personal information
which is used for the financial transactions, private contacts, and a gallery
containing pictures and videos, and so on. This nature of the mobile de-
vices tempts malicious attackers to steal the valuable information through
malware attacks, which makes it necessary to protect the mobile devices
against the information leakage.
Of course, the malware attacks are not new threats. The malwares on
mobile devices are not quite different from those of PCs (personal computer)
such as desktops and laptops. In order to protect from malware attacks, there
have been proposed a lot of solutions to detect the malwares. However, the
legacy solutions are not suitable for mobile devices because of the limited
capacity and computing resources of mobile devices.
One of alternative solutions to overcome the limitation of mobile de-
vices is to detect malwares by using separate servers. The basic concept is
that separate powerful servers take on the detection which requires a heavy
workload on behalf of mobile devices. Recently, with the prevalent use of
the cloud computing, Virtual Machines (VM) are widely used as the separate
servers. In this thesis, therefore, every separate server is assumed to oper-
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Figure 1: Distribution of mobile threats by platform , 2004-2012.[23]
ate as the VM in the cloud. This kind of solutions can be broadly classified
into two different approaches, sandbox-based and replay-based. As Figure
.1 shows that mobile threats targeting android platforms have massively in-
creased due the huge the number of usage of Android platform, almost 94%
of the attacks attack android based on applications
Firstly, the sandbox-based approach[18, 26, 29, 31, 20, 32, 22] literally
uses a VM as a sandbox1. In this approach, the required security modules,
e.g., a static malware detector or a dynamic behavior analyzer, are installed
into the VM, and a suspicious program is executed and analyzed through
the installed security modules in the VM acting as a sandbox. Thus, this ap-
proach can avoid the overload of mobile devices for detection. Furthermore,
the information can always be protected even if the suspicious program ful-
fills its task since the VM is not a real mobile device but just a sandbox.
However, it cannot be guaranteed that the behaviors of the suspicious pro-
1 Sandbox is a security mechanism for separating untrusted or suspicious programs.
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gram are examined thoroughly, which is called a Code Coverage Problem,
since the inputs to the program, e.g., typing numbers or pressing a volume
button, are not generated from a real user, but an emulator.
Secondly, in the replay-based approach[34, 24], all the events that oc-
cur in the mobile device are replayed in the VM. Similar to the sandbox, the
required security modules are installed into a VM, and they examine the be-
haviors of the suspicious program. The main difference is that the inputs to
the application program are sent from the real user's device in real-time, and
what the suspicious program does in the mobile device are replayed in the
VM. In other words, the VM executes the suspicious program one more time
with the same inputs as the mobile device. Therefore, it does not have the
code coverage problem due to the use of the actual user's inputs. However,
it needs the initial overhead to make the same environment as the mobile
device in the VM, and the communication overhead to transmit user's input
to the VM. The fatal shortcoming is that it cannot prevent the information
leakage since it is a post processing method. That means even if malicious
behaviors are detected in the VM, the information has been already stolen
from the mobile device.
To sum up, the sandbox-based approaches offer the secure analysis en-
vironment which can prevent the information leakage, but have the code
coverage problem. On the other hand, the replay-based approaches provide
the complete examination, but cannot guarantee the information leakage
prevention, which causes the degradation of security level. So far, we have
had to abandon one of code coverage and security level because of the trade-
off between two different approaches.
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We propose a new approach to overcome the tradeoff, which is an
offloading-based security solution for mobile devices called SORcloud (Se-
curity ORiented cloud). SORcloud also installs the required security service
modules on a VM, executes a suspicious program in the VM, and makes
it analyzed through the security modules. It is noteworthy that execution
offloading2 is introduced for dynamic analysis for the behaviors of mobile
devices.
The rest is organized as follows.In Section 2, we discuss related work.
In Section 3, we explain SORcloud framework design and implementation.
Section 4 evaluate SORcloud. we conclude in Section 5 and finally in Sec-
tion 6, we discuss future work.
2The execution offloading is a technique that gets some parts of a program code run in a




Android is open platform for mobile platform, embedded and wear-
able devices, it’s based on Linux kernel made by google with user interface
based on direct manipulation. The android application frame work has dif-
ferent structure, it doesn’t have main function and return call, though the
developers should design the applications in terms of components, Android
applications are executed by Dalvik . Dalvik is open-source software and
it’s a process virtual machine made specifically for android and considered
as integrated part of android software stack. .apk files are the application
packages for android systems and consists of 3 compressed files 1- class
byte code 2-resources 3- Binary native files. After these components are
compressed, it is signed by a key created by SDK.
Android applications are written in Java, and compiled into bytecode
for the java virtual machine which is translated in to dalvik bytecode and
stored in .dex (Dalvik Executable) and .odex (optimized dalvik executable)
files. The main advantage of using dalvik that it is optimized for low mem-
ory requirements as it uses less space and the constant pool has been mod-
ified to use 32-bit indices to simplify the process of the interpreter and ac-
cording to google developers, dalvik allows the device to run multiple in-
stances of the VM efficiently.
offloading is considered one of the cloud computing techiques that is
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being developed to connect mobile devices with limited resources to pow-
erful cloud servers to perform complicated operations in much less time for
efficiency and robustness , The act of transferring a process between two
machines in a network (the source and the destination node) during its ex-
ecution,I offloading process, the code is segmented into parts and might be
offloaded statically or dynamically depending on the complexity of the code




An android application sandbox system called aasandbox [18] is one
of the early sandbox based approaches. An application is executed in a
fully isolated environment, where low-level interactions like system calls
are logged for monitoring and analysis. The other sandbox based approach
is Appspalyground [26], which consists of detection components and ex-
ploration mechanisms to analyze smart phone applications. The automatic
exploration mechanism is used to allow more parts of the application to be
executed, which can increase the code coverage. Mobile-sandbox [29] is
a sand-box based hybrid system combining static and dynamic analysis. It
detects the malicious behaviors of an application by logging calls to native
(non-Java) APIs. Andrubis [31] is also a hybrid system designed to analyze
unknown applications. It performs more efficient dynamic analysis by us-
ing the results of the static analysis. Taintdroid[32, 20] is a dynamic taint
tracking system which has the ability to track multiple sources of sensitive
data. It provides the real time analysis by leveraging Android’s virtualized
execution environment. Droidbox [22] is based on the Taintdroid approach.
It provides an effective way for dynamic analysis, and generates the reports
for information leakage via network, file and SMS. Furthermore, the analy-
sis process could show the cryptography operations which is being done in
the execution using Android API[17]. Secloud[34] is one of replay based
7
Figure 2: AASandbox [18]
approaches. It replicates a device registered to a designated cloud, and re-
plays the replica in the cloud through the synchronization of the device and
the replica by passing the device inputs and network connections. It allows
the server to perform a resource-intensive security analysis. Another simi-
lar approach is Paranoid Android [24]. It provides security checks on re-
mote servers, and applies multiple detection techniques simultaneously. The
difference between the two replay based approaches is that in paranoid ap-
proach the tracing and replay process are done in the application level and
it has the advantage of removing the non-deterministic inputs.
Sandbox and replay based approaches are similar to our work, In sand-
box approaches, the main difference is that sandbox uses user data gener-
ated by emulator, however we use user input’s state data generated by de-
8
Figure 3: Secloud [34]
vice which increases code cover and makes it hard to malwares detection
to speculate the type of environment they are running in. In replay based
approaches, instead of replicating all the data to the VM and by the time re-
play based solutions detect the suspicious behavior, the device would have
already been attacked, however SORcloud offloads the required data from
device to the VM using the the specific data state, which minimize the band-
width and storage capacity , besides that the device can’t fully execute the
application until it has been confirmed by security models in cloud that it’s
out of any suspicious activity.
A study on tools of malware analaysis tools has been done to find out




Androgaurd is Android analysis tool written by Python to disassem-
ble and decompile Apk files, Dex/Odex, Android’s binary xml and An-
droid Resources. Androgaurd can analysis a bunch of Android apps with
ipython/sublime text editor, Androgaurd uses androlyze.py which interac-
tive tool with high level comments, it can also measure the efficiency of
the obfuscators and determine if the application has been pirated or not,
it also has the ability to check if the application is listed in the open source
database of malwares so it will notify whether the application has been listed
the black listed database. There is a risk indicator as well for suspected ma-
licious applications. It has also ability to reverse engineering of applications
including transform android’s binary xml into classic xml, and also it can
visualize the application with gephi [2] or with cytoscape [6] or PNG/DOT
output.
3.2 Andriod-apktool
Andriod-apktool is a tool for reverse engineering, it’s also capable to
decode resources to original form and repacking them after having some
modifications, there is also possibility to analysis and debug smali code line
by line. Smali code is assembly language based on Jasmin syntax which has
full functionality dex format[10]. APKTool requires you to use a separate
app such as Notepad++ to edit the decompiled binaries. Once that’s done,
you then have to go back to APKTool to recompile the modified app [5] .
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3.3 Dex2Jar
Dex2Jar is designed to read Dalvik executables format of Android ap-
plication into jar format which is understandable and readable by other java
reversing tools, more ever the dex2Jar is used by APKinspector to transform
the jar file into understandable format Dex2jar contains of 6 components:
1- dex-reades : is designeed to read the Dalvik Excutable format.
2- dex-translator : is designed to do the convert job and it reads the dex
instruction to dex-ir format after some optimize after that convert to ASM
format.
3- dex-ir : used ti dex-translator to represent the dex instruction.
4- dex-tools : tools to work with ,class files like modify a apk and DeObud-
scate a jar
5- d2j-smali : is to disassemble dex tosmali files and assemble dex form
smali files
6- dex-writer : is to write dex same way as dex-reader
3.4 Dexter
Dexter is a static web based malware analysis that allows uploading an-
droid applications which needs to be analyzed. The tool extracts as much in-
formation as possible from either legitimate or malicious applications (APKs)
and displays them in various different views[16]. It shows a quick overview
of all metadata and included packages of the application, more ever the de-
pendency graph shows all included packages and its interconnections with
ability to go through all the method list of each method and each method
11
will show list of classes and functions.
3.5 APKInspector
Apkinspector is a group of tools in one user interface. After the .apk has
been loaded you can load the Smali representation of functions by select-
ing the function in the Methods tab in the side view. APKInspector comes
with Jad, a Java decompiler. It should be able to decompile most classes,
but regularly creates mistakes that either prevent a recompilation or some-
times make the class very hard to understand. Also it might fail completely
in some cases, then the Smali representation must be used. There are new
analysis features have been developed recently [4]:
• Reverse the Code with Ded[1] for Java Analysis
• Static Instrumentation
• Combine Permission Analysis
3.6 API monitor
API Monitor is an open source software that allows you to monitor
and control API calls which are revoked by the applications and services,
it’s one of the most powerful applications to track down and analysis the
problems occurred during running in android application, and it supports
32 bit and 64 bit applications, there are more than 13000 API’s definitions
from 200 DLL’s plus over 17000 methods. It also decodes and displays 100
different types of unions and structures. It has the ability to display tree
which explains the hierarchy of API calls and the duration, call stack for
12
Figure 4: APImointor architecture[8]
each call.
There are so many malware android tools have been implementing in
many researches, and each one of these has its own specifications and draw-
backs. Also each one varies on the time consumed to transform the Dalvik
executable files into jar files, for example Androgaurd has many other tool
compare to other malware analysis tools and it has the ability to visualize the
application with gephi or cytospace or PNG/DOT format. More ever it can
determine if the application has been pirated or altered, and also it can show
indicators if the application might have malicious code or even suspected.
Most of tools transform the APK to Java. They, however, do not provide
reverse engineering tools for compiled part of APK file.
13
Figure 5: migration overview of CloneCloud[33]
3.7 offloading
there are many several studies try to empower mobile devices through
offloading based on systems, one of the efficient mobile cloud computing
is called cloneCloud proposed by sangjung Yang in paper named as fast
dynamic executation offloading for efficient mobile cloud computing [33],
where there were new proposed techniques to reduce the transferred data
size by transferring the important heap objects which positively influences
the transfer time and the efficiency of the offloading.
In figure 5, it shows when the process is started , the CloneCloud would
detect the the point where it has to start offloading to the cloud,and transfer
the process to the server in the other side, Also it ends the offloading process
when end migration is triggered in the code
one of the other studies was done by satya-narayanan et al.[28] which
is considered one of the earliest studies that enhances mobile devices with
remotely connected servers, it immigrates the full VM image along with the
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process in order to offload the process running on the device, on the other
hand , the amount of the transfered data is considered to be around massive
( a couple number of gigabytes ), another approach was proposed by the
same author to lower the load called VM synthesis approach [27] where
small overlay of the VM is sent to nearby small cloud by mobile device
where the VM is already installed with the base VM where the overlay was






I proposed a new solution called SorCloud, as a hybrid system com-
bining advantages from sandbox based and replay based approaches , SOR-
cloud provides both static and dynamic analysis for mobile devices. While
the static analysis is performed when an application is installed into a device,
the dynamic analysis inspects the behaviors of the application at run-time.
According to the purpose, Sorcloud is implemented based on offloading ap-
proach to reduce the communication bandwidth between the mobile device
and the cloud due the heavily bandwidth needed between both of them. there
are seven modules of SORcloud which can be classified into three main cat-
egories:
1) Security modules,
2) Execution offloading modules.
3) System modules,
Each of these categories consists of sub-parts , however some of the mod-
ules will be explained in install-time and run-time.
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4.2 System Modules
System modules consist of Installer and Packet Manager, packet man-
ager is in charge of automatic forwarding packet rules in the cloud server,
it receives the packet from the designated device with device identification
and forwards it to the specific Virtual machine with same device identifica-
tion using some rules set by SDN (a software-defined network) controller.
when every mobile device registers itself into the cloud. the KVM will cre-
ate VM with same device ID that the mobile has, As shown in figure 6, the
main task of the packet manager is to direct the coming packets from the
registered devices to the designated Virtual machine in KVM,
According to figure 6, Installing APK file requires 7 steps starting from
downloading the APK from third party, and sending the APK to the packet
Manager, packet manager will send it to static security analysis module, if
it is free of any suspected behaviors,it will be assigned to proper VM for in-
stallion, after that, .the installing process will start into the VM in the cloud.
After that APK file will be injected with the offloading code and it will be
sent back to the mobile device with permission of installing. after the mobile
device gets the green light from the cloud, it installs the modified version of
the APK in the device. when the mobile device starts installing, it will keep
synchronizing with the application in the same VM in the cloud
17
Figure 6: Install time steps
4.3 Execution offloading




For the runtime execution offloading, it is needed to determine which
parts of the application code should be offloaded in order to analyze dynamic
behaviors of the application at runtime. Code instrumentation is a process
to inject the codes which indicate the offloading points for the thread mi-
gration. An android application usually consists of various call-back meth-
ods, which are invoked only when designated events happen. Since some of
the designated events should be analyzed at runtime through offloading, the
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offloading points generally correspond to call-back methods. For example,
assume that a click event on a button invokes a call-back method. If the call-
back method is executed in the cloud, we can monitor the behaviors of this
click event.
In SORcloud, we define target method which is a call-back method to be
monitored at runtime. There are two kinds of target methods:
1- User Interface call-back method
2- Activity Life Cycle call-back method.
• User Interface call-back methods : onClick(),
onLongClick(), onFucusChange(), onKey(), onTouch(),
onCreateContextMenu()
• Activity Life Cycle call-back methods : onCreate(), onStart(),
onResume(), onPause(), onStop(), onDestroy()
In code instrumentation part, two dummy -empty- methods
(doMigration() and doRemigration()) are declared first. The dummy
methods are inserted at the beginning and end of the target method body, re-
spectively.When doMigration() method is invoked at the device, the
execution offloading starts. In the other way, when doRemigration()
method is invoked at the cloud, the execution offloading ends.
However, there may be some codes in the target method body which
cannot be offloaded. For example, UI related API codes, e.g., getting/setting



























Table 1: UserInterface call-back methods
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e.g., reading GPS or sensor values, cannot be executed in the cloud because
these codes do not work correctly in VM. Therefore, we define these meth-
ods as non-offloadable API code which should be executed only in the de-
vice, not in the cloud. If there are any non-offloadable API codes in the target
method body, the code is executed in the device. Fig.7 shows an example of
Code Instrumentation.
As Figure 7 shows how the jasmin code after inturmentation will look
like, The codes written in bold are injected ones by Code instrumentor.
doMigration() and doRemigration() methods are defined in (1).
These methods are inserted in the target method to apply execution offload-
ing (2) and to guarantee non-offloadable API code executed in the device
(3). Through this, it is determined that which codes are executed in ei-
ther device (4) or cloud (5). In order to implement Code Instrumentor, we
use dex2jar[13] which is one of android reverse engineering tools. Using
dex2jar, we unpack apk file and obtain dex file from it. And the dex file is
converted into the jar file, after that the jar file is transformed into Jasmin
format[21]. So these Jasmin codes are the input of our Code Instrumentor.
After finishing instrumenting on Jasmin code, these codes are transformed
and packed with apk file by using dex2jar.
4.3.2 Thread Migration
The proposed SORcloud exploits the execution offloading to monitor
runtime behaviors of a unknown application by executing the application
code in the cloud. More specifically, we use execution offloading technique

































22 .limit locals 3
23 .limit stack 2
24 .end method
25 //definition of doMigration method
26 .method public doMigration()V
27 return
28 .limit locals 1
29 .limit stack 0
30 .end method
31 //definition of doRemigration method
32 .method public doRemigration()V
33 return
34 .limit locals 1
35 .limit stack 0
36 .end method
Figure 7: Example of Jasmin code after code instrumentation.
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gration has been already suggested in several studies[19, 33], and we use
some modules of the existing frameworks. In this subsection, it will be de-
scribed what modules are being used and how these modules work. In An-
droid framework, each android application runs on an application virtual
machine(VM)1. Once an application VM is assigned, it allocates a thread to
execute the application code. The state of the thread, i.e., program registers,
call stack and heap objects, are changing while the application code is be-
ing executed. For the thread migration between a device and a server, these
state should be transferred between them. This state transfer is handled by
two modules, State Manager and Offloader. State Manager captures and re-
stores the state, and Offloader sends and receives the state from a device to a
server and vise verse. State Manager exists for each application VM in both
a device and a server. When the codes injected by Code Instrumentor are
executed, the interpreter of an application VM signals to State Manager to
capture the state of the thread and to suspend execution of the thread. When
State Manager receives the state from Offloader, it restores and resumes the
suspended thread with the received state. Offloader implemented as Android
application sends and receives state of a thread from and to state manager
as well as transfers them between a device and a cloud.
4.4 Security Modules
Static Analyzer and Dynamic Analyzer are security modules.





































Figure 8: SORcloud overview.
These modules, furthermore, can be divided into two types according
to when they work, install-time and run-time modules. In this section, we
briefly explain how each module works at install-time and run-time.
Fig.8 shows the overview of SORcloud.The dotted and solid lines present
the flows of static analysis and dynamic analysis, respectively. The execu-
tion offloading process at the install-time is started when a user wants to in-
stall a new application into device (a). Before the installation, the application
file(.apk) is sent to Packet Manager in the cloud (b). After Static Analyzer
receives the file from Packet Manager, it decides whether it is a malware or
not (c). If any malicious activities are not found by Static Analyzer, the apk
file would be passed to Code Instrumentor (d). Code Instrumentor inserts a
bit of codes to trigger execution offloading at runtime. After that, the instru-
mented apk file is installed in virtual machine(VM) in cloud (e) and is sent
to packet manager (f). Finally, the device receives modified apk file from the
24
cloud and installs it (g-h).
When the user launches the application which was instrumented at
install-time, the runtime process of SORcloud begins. This process is pre-
sented with the solid line in Fig.8. When the codes inserted by Code Instru-
mentor trigger the execution offloading during the application execution,
State Manager in the device captures the state of the current application
thread, and suspends the thread (1). On receiving the state from State Man-
ager (2), Offloader in the device passes the state to Packet Manager in the
cloud (3). Packet Manager forwards the state to Offloader in VM where the
application was installed (4). State Manager inside VM receives the state
from Offloader, and restores the application thread and resumes the execu-
tion (5). During the execution, the dynamic analyzer monitors the behav-
iors, i.e., network traffic, of the application thread (6). When the execution
offloading ends, State Manager in VM captures the state of the current appli-
cation thread and suspend it (7). If no malicious behavior is detected during
execution, the state is sent back to Offloader in the device (8-10). Then State
Manager takes over this state (11), restores the application thread, and re-
sumes the execution (12). Whenever the execution offloading occurs, this
run-time process is repeated.
4.5 Security Analysis
For security analysis, SORcloud can adopt various security modules.
However, this work does not focus on security modules, but on the offload-
ing framework for security analysis. In this work, therefore, we just use two
25
types of security modules, Source code analysis and Network security mod-
ules. The source code analysis module, Static Analyzer in this work, ana-
lyzes the source code before the offloading and the network security module,
Dynamic Analyzer, checks if the information leakage happens through the
network.
As a source code analysis module, the Virustotal website tool[14] is
used. This tool examines android applications and URLs with 54 different
virus-scanning software products. Static Analyzer automatically sends an
APK file that a user clicked on his/her device to the tool through the public
APIs.
Untangle[15] is used as Dynamic Analyzer in order to prevent the in-
formation leakage by malicious application. It is an open source solution
that combines the GUI web-based network management and control for
network security. In this work, Dynamic Analyzer is configured to block
the traffic outgoing to specific websites. It monitors traffic generated by the
running application and reports filtering results.
4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Experimental setup
In this work, we have built the prototype of SORcloud. We used Galaxy
Nexus with dual-core 1.2 Ghz CPU and 1 GB of RAM as a mobile device.
For the cloud, a quad-core desktop with a 3.4GHz CPU and 32 GB of RAM
running CentOS 6.5 is used. And using KVM, 2GHz core and 8GB of mem-
ory are allocated to each VM in the cloud. Packet Manager is implemented
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on Software Defined Network (SDN)[11] controller. A mobile device and
VMs use the same Android 4.0.3 version. State Manager is implemented by
modifying Dalvik VM. Installer and Offloader are implemented as an an-
droid application. Code Instrumentor is implemented by using dex2jar[13].
4.6.2 Experimental results
4.6.2.1 Efficiency of dynamic analysis
The first concern is the networking traffic caused by transferring the
state for execution offloading because the application execution may be de-
layed due to data exchange time. To show that SORcloud incurs the reason-
able amount of traffic, we measure the traffic caused when a user executes
an application remotely through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)[12]. The
RDP provides the user with a graphical user interface to connect to a remote
VM actually running the application over a network connection. there are
three real world applications have been choose for testing.
4.6.2.2 TinyURL
this application is used to create and share TinyURLs on mobile device.
it has many other features like converting a URL to a tinyURL before it’s
being shared by any application like browser, you tube and others, and also
it has the ability to copy and paste the link to the clipboard
27
4.6.2.3 MOTP
MOTP stands for mobile one time password is a free one time syn-
chronize authentication software for android devices, it consists of client (a
J2ME MIDlet) and a server (a unix shell script), the sever part might be
considered as radius server[9]
In Table 2, the table shows the data sizes as the offloading happens for each
injected function in MOTP, the test was done for function by function in the
program
4.6.2.4 DroidWeight
DroidWeight is a free software which allows you to track you weight
and keep you updataped about your weights changes[7].















OnCreate() 16 446837 441840 2 386444 48 19
onResume() 12 451065 445952 2 389164 80 15
onclick 25 452139 446996 2 389798 52 28
onlcick(genretate) 32 451045 445928 3 389168 56 36
onresume() 47 496792 489972 3 417195 32 52
onclickprofile Motp 42 424747 420468 10 375780 60 58
onlickprof HOTP 48 424747 420468 5 375780 60 58
onlcickprof-totp 37 424747 420468 7 375780 60 47













creat entry 34 613360 605248 5 507840 40 42
delete entry 37 912355 903036 4 798263 44 43
oncreate 14 160837 157788 2 121972 44 16
oncreate1 12 160837 157788 1 121972 44 13
Onresume() 19 677347 665872 4 537264 32 26
onDestory() 31 587646 579746 4 486522 36 36
BMI Calc 41 652193 642496 5 526491 40 48
BMI Calc (go) 46 779255 768208 4 637251 52 52
show thers 27 2729695 2721660 9 2631565 16 39
months button 24 2729811 2721780 9 2631569 48 35
Table 3: Offloading data for DroidWieght
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Figure 9: Run-time data transfer overhead
4.6.2.5 comparison
The execution offloading traffic and the RDP traffic are compared for
three real world android applications: TinyURL[3], mOTP[9] and DroidWeight[7].
Fig.9 shows the average sizes of the transferred data while the ap-
plications are being executed with the same user scenario. In the cases of
TinyURL and mOTP, SORcloud incurs less network traffic than the RDP
solution. However, when DroidWeight is running, SORcloud incurs more
data traffic. these results can be explained as follows. In SORcloud, there is
no data transfer when a part of the application code is not offloaded. How-
ever, the more frequent offloading causes more network traffic. In the RDP
solution, upload data for the user inputs and download data for the screen
display are transferred continuously, even in the idle state. Although the
amount of network traffic varies according to the type of application, we
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1 public void DetectEmulator() {
2     // doMigration()
3     // ...
4     // doRemigration()
5     String devicename = Build.DEVICE;
6     // doMigration()
7     Log.d("SORcloud", devicename);
8     if (devicename.equals("laptop")) {
9         // in case of emulator(or VM)
10     } else {
11         // in case of device, do something.
12         String html = 
DownloadHtml("http://facebook.com/");
13         System.out.println(html);
14     }
15     // doRemigration()
16 }
Figure 10: Sample Java code of emulator detection
can say SORcloud is comparable with the RDP. That means SORcloud is
sufficient to execute applications in real time.
4.6.2.6 Security enhancement
Since many recent approaches use a mobile device emulator for dy-
namic analysis to detect malwares, malware developers devise techniques
to evade the malware detection. One of popular techniques is to stop a mal-
ware working in an emulator. Therefore, malware developers exploit some
APIs to check the running environment [25, 30].
Although SORcloud also relies on a VM-based emulator in the cloud,
malwares have no way to figure out their running environments since the
non-offloadable API codes are executed only in the mobile device.
Fig.10 shows a example code for emulation detection. The code at line
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Figure 11: Result of network monitor[15]
5 is to get name of device, and the code at line 7-14 is the actual behavior
based on the name of device. According to the execution environment, the
behavior of this code would be different. If this code is executed in an em-
ulator, we cannot detect the malicious code since nothing happens. On the
other hand, in SORcloud, the mobile device name is obtained since the code
line 5 is executed in the mobile device. And the state of thread including the
object for a device name are migrated to the cloud. Therefore, even if the
code at line 7-14 is executed in the emulator, we can detect the malicious
behavior as if this code is running in the real mobile device. Fig.11 shows
the network behavior is monitored by Dynamic Analyzer.
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4.7 CONCLUSION
In this thesis, SORcloud is a cloud based solution for detecting mo-
bile android malware statically and dynamically. The execution offloading
technique is introduced to monitor the runtime behavior of applications.
SORcloud overcomes limitations of the existing approaches, code cover-
age problem and security degradation. It is shown that SORcloud can detect
efficiently malicious behaviors of unknown applications at runtime.
As Table 4 shows briefly the three common approaches on mobile de-
vice security, offloading has better user interactivity compare to sandbox
and replay, it consumes less power and one of the important features that it





No A little much
Power
consumption




Prevention Yes No Yes
Table 4: Comparison of Sandbox, replay, and offloading
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4.8 FUTURE WORK
Since SORcloud is an extensible cloud based framework, it can easily
add or remove security modules. Therefore, it will be the first step to add
more security modules such as System Call Monitor and Taint Analyzer to
monitor various dynamic behaviors.
SORcloud does not examine the non-offloadable APIs in order to hin-
der malwares from figuring out the running environment. However, since it
may be asked if the non-offloadable APIs are safe, a mechanism to monitor




[2] androguard - reverse engineering, malware and goodware analysis of
android applications ... and more (ninja !) - google project hosting.
https://code.google.com/p/androguard/. (Visited on
05/19/2015).
[3] android-tinyurl - tinyurl intergration for the android flatform. https:
//code.google.com/p/android-tinyurl/.
[4] apkinspector - **moved to github** apkinspector is a powerful gui
tool for analysts to analyze the android applications. - google project
hosting. https://code.google.com/p/apkinspector/.
(Visited on 05/19/2015).
[5] Apktool - a tool for reverse engineering android apk files.
https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/. (Visited on
05/19/2015).
[6] Cytoscape: An open source platform for complex network analysis
and visualization. http://www.cytoscape.org/. (Visited on
05/19/2015).
[7] droidweight - a weight tracking android app. https://code.
google.com/p/droidweight/.
36
[8] Kelwin yang, student at google summer of code 2012 — slideshare.
http://www.slideshare.net/KelwinYang/. (Visited on
05/19/2015).
[9] motp - one time passwords for android. https://code.google.
com/p/motp/.
[10] smali - an assembler/disassembler for android’s dex format - google
project hosting. https://code.google.com/p/smali/.
(Visited on 05/19/2015).
[11] Software defined network. http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/VirusTotal.
[12] Spice. http://www.spice-space.org/.




[15] Web filter lite. http://wiki.untangle.com/index.php/
Web_Filter_Lite.
[16] Welcome to dexter’s documentation! — dexter 1.0 documentation.
http://dexter.dexlabs.org/static/docs/. (Visited on
05/19/2015).
[17] Droidbox - android application sandbox. https://code.
google.com/p/droidbox, Feb. 2015.
37
[18] T. Blasing, L. Batyuk, A.-D. Schmidt, S. A. Camtepe, and S. Albayrak.
An android application sandbox system for suspicious software detec-
tion. In Malicious and unwanted software (MALWARE), 2010 5th in-
ternational conference on, pages 55–62. IEEE, 2010.
[19] B.-G. Chun, S. Ihm, P. Maniatis, M. Naik, and A. Patti. Clonecloud:
elastic execution between mobile device and cloud. In Proceedings
of the sixth conference on Computer systems, pages 301–314. ACM,
2011.
[20] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, S. Han, V. Tendulkar, B.-G. Chun, L. P. Cox,
J. Jung, P. McDaniel, and A. N. Sheth. Taintdroid: an information-
flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones.
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 32(2):5, 2014.
[21] I. K. Jon Meyer, Daniel Reynaud. Jasmin home page. http://
jasmin.sourceforge.net/, 2004.
[22] P. Lantz, A. Desnos, and K. Yang. Droidbox: Android application
sandbox, 2012.
[23] D. Maslennikov. Jasmin home page. http://
securelist.com/analysis/publications/36996/
mobile-malware-evolution-part-6/, 2013.
[24] G. Portokalidis, P. Homburg, K. Anagnostakis, and H. Bos. Paranoid
android: versatile protection for smartphones. In Proceedings of the
26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 347–
356. ACM, 2010.
38
[25] T. Raffetseder, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. Detecting system emulators.
In Information Security, pages 1–18. Springer, 2007.
[26] V. Rastogi, Y. Chen, and W. Enck. Appsplayground: automatic secu-
rity analysis of smartphone applications. In Proceedings of the third
ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy, pages
209–220. ACM, 2013.
[27] M. Satyanarayanan, P. Bahl, R. Caceres, and N. Davies. The case for
vm-based cloudlets in mobile computing. Pervasive Computing, IEEE,
8(4):14–23, 2009.
[28] M. Satyanarayanan, B. Gilbert, M. Toups, N. Tolia, D. R. O’Hallaron,
A. Surie, A. Wolbach, J. Harkes, A. Perrig, D. J. Farber, et al. Pervasive
personal computing in an internet suspend/resume system. Internet
Computing, IEEE, 11(2):16–25, 2007.
[29] M. Spreitzenbarth, F. Freiling, F. Echtler, T. Schreck, and J. Hoffmann.
Mobile-sandbox: Having a deeper look into android applications. In
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Comput-
ing, pages 1808–1815. ACM, 2013.
[30] T. Vidas and N. Christin. Evading android runtime analysis via sand-
box detection. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM symposium on Informa-
tion, computer and communications security, pages 447–458. ACM,
2014.
[31] L. Weichselbaum, M. Neugschwandtner, M. Lindorfer, Y. Fratantonio,
V. van der Veen, and C. Platzer. Andrubis: Android malware under
39
the magnifying glass. Vienna University of Technology, Tech. Rep.
TRISECLAB-0414-001, 2014.
[32] B.-g. C. L. P. C. J. J. P. M. William Enck, Peter Gilbert and A. N.
Sheth. Taintdroid: An information-flow tracking system for realtime
privacy monitoring on smartphones. In OSDI, 2010.
[33] S. Yang, Y. Kwon, Y. Cho, H. Yi, D. Kwon, J. Youn, and Y. Paek. Fast
dynamic execution offloading for efficient mobile cloud computing.
In Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom), 2013 IEEE
International Conference on, pages 20–28. IEEE, 2013.
[34] S. Zonouz, A. Houmansadr, R. Berthier, N. Borisov, and W. Sanders.
Secloud: A cloud-based comprehensive and lightweight security solu-




Cloud Security Solution of Mobile
Applications based on Execution
Offloading
지금까지 모바일기기를 악성 공격으로부터 방어하기 위한 기술들은 모
바일 기기의 제한된 자원으로 인해 어려움을 겪어왔다. 이러한 상황에서
한가지해결방안은원격에존재하는클라우드환경에서의가상머신을통
해 이러한 자원을 많이 소비하는 보안 분석을 모바일 기기대신 실행하도
록 하는 것이다. 하지만 기존 클라우드를 사용한 방법들은 여전히 코드
커버리지 문제나 보안성 약화와 같은 문제점이 존재한다. 따라서 본 연
구에서는 클라우드를 이용해 정적, 동적분석을 실시하는 SORcloud라는
새로운 클라우드기반의 해결책을 제안한다. 동적분석을 위해 SORcloud
는의심스러운어플리케이션의프로세스를원격의가상머신에서실행되
게 하였고, 이를 통해 기존 클라우드 기반의 방법들이 가지는 단점들을
해결하였다. 그리고 실험을 통해 제안하는 해결책이 얼마나 효율적으로
동작하고,악성행위를검출해내는지를보였다.
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